Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is _actually_ known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal (...) saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. (shrink)

This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just (...) in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one’s language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S’s non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief—a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell’s obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents. (shrink)

The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...) practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (shrink)

Includes bibliography: p. 7-12 and bibliographical references.

When does a human being begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard have argued that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. In their view, a human individual begins to exist at gastrulation, i. e. at about sixteen days after fertilization. In this paper we argue that even granting Smith and Brogaard's ontological commitments and biological assumptions, the existence of a human being can be shown to (...) begin much earlier, viz., with fertilization. Their interpretative claim that a zygote divides immediately into two substances and therefore ceases to exist is highly implausible by their own standards, and their factual claim that there is no communication between the blastomeres has to be abandoned in light of recent embryological research. (shrink)

In the debate about the moral status of human embryos, it is not always clear which arguments are actually disputed. This book offers students and researchers, but also laypersons interested in the current debate, the opportunity to inform themselves about the current state of discussion and to learn about the most important arguments in a clear and concise form. These arguments are as follows: Since embryos as members of the species homo sapiens sapiens are human beings, they possess dignity (species (...) argument); embryos develop continuously, i.e. without morally relevant incisions, into adult human beings possessing dignity (continuum argument); embryos are identical with adult human beings possessing dignity (identity argument); embryos have the potential to become human beings, and this potential is without restriction worth protecting (potentiality argument). These arguments are each represented by a pro position and a contra position and defended or criticized. In an accompanying contribution by the editors, the four arguments in context are reconstructed, evaluated, and supported by new arguments. (shrink)

Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictionsincluding the identication of the worst case. The development of (...) such a modal methodology is particularly vital with respect to predictions of climate change. I show that a methodological dilemma emerges when possibilistic predictions are framed in traditional terms and argue that a more nuanced conceptual framework, distinguishing dierent types of possibility, should be used in order to convey our uncertain knowledge about the future. The new conceptual scheme, however, questions the applicability of standard rules of rational decision-making, thus generating new challenges. (shrink)

The time is near where ‘therapeutic’ bodily assistive devices, developed to mimic species-typical body structures in order to enable normative body functioning, will allow the wearer to outperform the species-typical body in various functions. Although such devices are developed for people that are seen to exhibit sub species-typical abilities, many ‘therapeutic enhancements’ might also be desired and used by people that exhibit species-typical body abilities. This paper presents the views of members of the World Federation of the Deaf on potential (...) beyond species-typical abilities enabling therapeutic assistive devices (i.e. related to hearing). Survey respondents showed support for the development and uptake of beyond normal hearing enabling devices. The views of survey respondents as clients affect hearing-enabling professions (such as audiologist and speech pathologists). The paper analyzes what guidance code of ethics of hearing enabling professions give in regards to beyond normal hearing enabling devices. This paper suggests that people labeled impaired and the professions that serve them should more involved in the enhancement discourse. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 387-388.

This paper develops concepts and procedures for the evaluation of complex debates. They provide means for answering such questions as whether a thesis has to be considered as proven or disproven in a debate or who carries a burden of proof. While being based on classical logic, this framework represents an (argument-based) approach to non-monotonic, or defeasible reasoning. Debates are analysed as dialectical structures, i.e. argumentation systems with an attack- as well as a support-relationship. The recursive status assignment over the (...) arguments is conditionalised on proponents in a debate. The problem of multiple status assignments arising on circular structures is solved by showing that uniqueness can be guaranteed qua reconstruction of a debate. The notion of burden of proof as well as other discursive aims rational proponents pursue in a debate is defined within the framework. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:174 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (960-1279) was in many aspects one of the most brilliant eras in Chinese history. One sees in this period the improvement of the bureaucratic system, the flourishing of a new poetic genre, the tz'u, a fresh approach to the study of Confucian cla~ics, the advancement of historiography and the rise of Neo-Confucianism. Ou-yang Hsiu (1907-1072) pioneered in all these magnificent political, cultural, and literary achievements. (...) Inevitably, he became a controversial figure to his contemporaries, and to later generations as well. There has not been a complete and balanced study, however, of this well-known and well-remembered man. Perhaps he was too broad and diverse a historical figure to be approached and studied easily. Professor Liu's book deserves our congratulations not merely for its well organized and scholarly presentation, but also for its successful approach to the subject from various angles. Ou-yang Hsiu was an official, a classicist, a political theorist, a historian, an essayist, and a poet. Accordingly this book gives separate chapters on Ou-yang Hsiu the classicist, the his= torian, the political theorist, the master of Sung literature, etc. With profound knowledge and sure control, the author organizes his materials so that the reader will not lose sight of the main points of the study. The best feature of this book (this reviewer feels) is that the author gives equal recognition to Ou-yang Hsiu the man and to the period in which he lived. Professor Liu ably and thoughtfully presents the historical characteristics of the Sung dynasty through Ou-yang Hsiu, and evaluates the merits and shortcomings, accomplishments and hmitations of Ouyang Hsiu against the peculiarity of his time. The subtitle of this book, An Eleventh=Century Neo=Con]ucianist, is most suitable. NeoConfucianism has always been studied abstractly as a philosophy, but Professor Liu's book shows us how this philosophy has been embodied in, substantialized, and practiced by "a key historical figure" who "gives us a finer perspective of his whole era." CONSTAN~II~.TUNG Pomona College Oeuvres philosophiques. u II (1638-1642). By Ren~ Descartes. Textes ~tablis, pr~sent~s et annot~s par Ferdinand Alqui~. ]~dition illustr~e. (Paris: Gamier Fr~res, 1967. [Classiques Gamier.] Pp. 1148.12 plates. Fr 29.-) Opere scientifiehe di Ren$ Descartes. A cura di Gianni Micheli. Vol. I: La Biologia. (Torino: Unione Tipographico-Editrice Torinese, 1966. Pp. 520. 6 plates.-Classici della scienza, ed. Ludovico Geymonat, No. 6/I. L 6,000.) The second volume of the Edition Alqui~ confirms what was said here when Volume I appeared (JHP, II [1964], 260f.): this edition supersedes all currently available study editions. Volume II continues the rigorously chronological arrangement which singularly suits the philosophical writings of Descartes' "metaphysical period." Like no other edition, this one illuminates the often forgotten character of Descartes' philosophizing as an interaction between an ongoing dialogue (correspondence and replies to critics) and rigorously systematic thought. Imbedded in the stream of letters we find the Meditations not as a monolithic block, but as a sequence of three publications: the Latin text inserted at the time-point of its completion, April 1640; the French text with the first six Objections and Responses, August 1641; and at the end of the volume, the Seventh Objections and Responses and the letter to Diner. Only the Objections of Gassendi and Bourdin have been slightly cut. The volume concludes with the Recherche de la v~rit~ of unascertainable date (Aliqui~ thinks that it fits best into the 1641-42 context, without insisting on his conjecture). We thus have an edition that allows us to read the Meditations as Descartes' contemporaries---friends and adversaries --did. Once again the editor's notes are admirable, and there are brief but important critiques of the revised AT volume containing the Meditations, based on source studies by the editor, Henri Gouhier, and by Leslie J. Beck. Since the Edition Alqui$ covers only the philosophical works, it is a pleasure to report a new Italian collection and translation of Descartes' scientific works by Professor Gianni BOOK REVIEWS 175 Micheli of the Institute of History of Philosophy at the University of Milan. The first volume contains... (shrink)

An e-mail interview made by Francisco Guzmán. April 2010.

This paper gives an explication of our intuitive notion of strength of justification in a controversial debate. It defines a thesis' degree of justification within the bipolar argumentation framework of the theory of dialectical structures as the ratio of coherently adoptable positions according to which that thesis is true over all coherently adoptable positions. Broadening this definition, the notion of conditional degree of justification, i.e.\ degree of partial entailment, is introduced. Thus defined degrees of justification correspond to our pre-theoretic intuitions (...) in the sense that supporting and defending a thesis t increases, whereas attacking it decreases, t's degree of justification. Moreover, it is shown that (conditional) degrees of justification are (conditional) probabilities. Eventually, the paper explains that it is rational to believe theses with a high degree of justification insofar as this strengthens the robustness of one's position. (shrink)

This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and researching into so-called climate engineering methods, i.e. large-scale technical interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting anthropogenic climate change. The moral reasons in favour of and against R&D into and deployment of CE methods are analysed by means of argument maps. These argument maps provide an overview of the CE controversy and help to structure the complex debate.

In recent years, researchers and practitioners have increasingly paid attention to food waste, which is seen as highly unethical given its negative environmental and societal implications. Waste recovery is dependent on the creation of connections along the supply chain, so that actors with goods at risk of becoming waste can transfer them to those who may be able to use them as inputs or for their own consumption. Such waste recovery is, however, often hampered by what we call ‘circularity holes’, (...) i.e., missing linkages between waste generators and potential receivers. A new type of actor, the digital platform organization, has recently taken on a brokerage function to bridge circularity holes, particularly in the food supply chain. Yet, extant literature has overlooked this novel type of brokerage that exploits digital technology for the transfer and recovery of discarded resources between supply chain actors. Our study investigates this actor, conceptualized as a ‘circularity broker’, and thus unites network research and circular supply chain research. Focusing on the food supply chain, we adopt an interpretive inductive theory-building approach to uncover how platform organizations foster the recovery of waste by bridging circularity holes. We identify and explicate six brokerage roles, i.e., connecting, informing, protecting, mobilizing, integrating and measuring, and discuss them in relation to extant literature, highlighting novelties compared to earlier studies. The final section reflects on contributions, implications, limitations and areas for further research. (shrink)

Limits of the Conversation about Forms. Types of Knowledge and Necessity of Forms in Plato's "Parmenides". - Forms (ideas) are among the things that Plato is serious about. But about these things he says in his "Seventh Letter": "There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject." (341c, transl. J. Harward). Plato's statement suggests the question, why one does not and never can do justice to the Platonic forms by means of a written text about (...) the forms. Another big question of Plato research is whether the conversations documented in the Platonic dialogues are also affected by this verdict. This paper aims to provide, as far as possible, newly substantiated answers to these two questions. To this end, the systematic limits of the discussion about forms, which are particularly evident in Plato's dialogue "Parmenides", are examined in eight steps: First, two types of knowledge are presented that play an important systematic role in Plato's philosophy with regard to the limits of conversation: knowledge-how (practical knowledge) and knowledge-that (propositional knowledge) (I). Then the Socratic model of these two types of knowledge is interpreted, which is drafted in the tenth book of the "Republic". This model uses the example of bridle, bridlemaker and rider to explain the primacy of practical knowledge and the limits of propositional knowledge (II). Subsequently, it will be shown how the dialogues "Republic" and "Parmenides" are connected with each other in content and form (III). The gradation of the two types of knowledge, which is indicated by the motifs of the bridle and the horse on the image level of the "Parmenides", proves to be the structure that systematically underlies the structure of the entire dialogue (IV). It also makes clear why the conversation about the forms in the first part of the "Parmenides" has to fail (V). The assumption that the two parts of the "Parmenides" express two different types of knowledge in dealing with forms is supported by the results of a logical analysis of the last defence of the acceptance of forms (135b-c). This analysis shows why, for reasons of principle, it is impossible to speak adequately about forms (VI). Forms have the function of being presuppositions of 'talking about something'. Thus forms are always presupposed in conversation when one talks about them, and thus elude appropriate discussion in conversation (VII). That this is not only a methodical insight of the Platonic Parmenides, but can also be attributed to Plato himself, is demonstrated by the concluding reinterpretation of the central sentence of the critique of writing in Plato's "Seventh Letter". It will become apparent that, contrary to the now widespread view of the representatives of the Tübingen school, philosophical and also good philological reasons speak for the fact that Plato related his criticism only to the communicability of forms through treatises, i.e. tract-like writings (VIII). (shrink)

The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change is a highly influential welfare analysis of climate policy measures which has been published in 2006. This paper identifies and systematically assesses the long-term socioeconomic and climatic predictions the Stern Review relies on, and reflects them philosophically. Being a cost-benefit analysis, the Stern Review has to predict the benefits of climate mitigation policies, i.e.the damaging consequences of climate change which might be avoided, as well as the costs of implementing such policies. (...) While distinguishing deterministic, probabilistic, and possibilisitic forecasts, this paper finds that the Review's major predictions severly suffer from a lack of robustness. It argues, moreover, that the use of subjective probabilities as well as the fact/value entanglement pose additional problems. Given our ignorance, this assessment raises finally the question how detailed an analysis of climate policy decisions should reasonably be at all, and whether the argument for acting against climate change is maybe very simple. (shrink)

Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By assigning different degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish between experts and novices and determine the trustworthiness of testimony. This paper probes the claim that epistemic trust furthers our epistemic enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of competence attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collaboratively seek to track down the truth. The results, obtained by simulating opinion dynamics, tend to subvert the very idea (...) that competence ascription is essential for the functioning of epistemic collaboration and hence veritistically valuable. On the contrary, we find that, in specific circumstances at least, epistemic trust may prevent a community from finding the truth effectively. (shrink)

Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By assigning different degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish between experts and novices and determine the trustworthiness of testimony. This paper probes the claim that epistemic trust furthers our epistemic enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of competence attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collaboratively seek to track down the truth. The results, obtained by simulating opinion dynamics, tend to subvert the very idea (...) that competence ascription is essential for the functioning of epistemic collaboration and hence veritistically valuable. On the contrary, we find that, in specific circumstances at least, epistemic trust may prevent a community from finding the truth effectively. (shrink)

"Wir mögen an der Natur beobachten, messen, rechnen, wägen und so weiter, wie wir wollen, es ist doch nur unser Maß und Gewicht, wie der Mensch das Maß der Dinge ist." So schrieb Goethe im Jahre 1807. "Die Natur wird uns keine Sonderbehandlung gewähren, nur weil wir uns als 'Krone der Schöpfung' betrachten... Ich fürchte, sie ist nicht eitel genug, um sich an den Menschen als einen Spiegel zu klammern, in dem allein sie ihre eigene Schönheit sehen kann", schreibt der (...) Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr heute. Diesen beiden Stellungnahmen liegen sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis Mensch - Natur zugrunde. Wie überhaupt die Naturphilosophie von den Vorsokratikern bis in die Gegenwart die unterschiedlichsten Varianten dieser Beziehung durchgespielt hat. Dass der Mensch sich jedoch in einem weit über die alttestamentarische Vorstellungskraft hinausgehenden Maße die Natur "untertan" gemacht und dabei großräumig zerstört hat, steht außer Zweifel. Im Rahmen der ökologischen Krise muss das Verhältnis zur Natur neu überdacht werden. Das vorliegende Lesebuch, das sich auch als Studientext und Diskussionsgrundlage für Schulen und Hochschulen bestens eignet, bietet den Blick in die Geschichte der Naturphilosophie, der dafür unerlässlich ist: Die Schwierigkeiten, die heute im Umgang mit der Natur auftreten, sind vielfach auf immer noch wirksame traditionelle Naturvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Andererseits gibt es einige eigenständige, bisher noch zu wenig berücksichtigte Ansätze, die zu neuen Konzeptionen anregen können. -/- ------------------------------------------------------------- Inhalt: Vorwort; Einführung: Traditionslinien der Naturphilosophie; Heraklit und die Atomisten Leukipp und Demokrit; Platon und Aristoteles; Christliches Naturverstehen im Mittelalter: Aurelius Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Jacob Böhme; Naturvorstellungen in der beginnenden Neuzeit: Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton; Kants Naturbegriff; Goethes Naturforschung; Nachkantische Naturphilosophie: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Geschichte der Natur und Kritik des Naturalismus: Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill; Kritik des Substanzbegriffes, Alfred North Whitehead, Werner Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine und Isabelle Stengers; Bibliographie. (shrink)

Langeweile wird in dieser Anthologie als Signatur der Moderne lesbar: Sie durchdringt die gegenwärtige Kultur, wird aber nach wie vor weggeschoben, ja tabuisiert. Der Band bietet eine Textauswahl von klassischen Denkern sowie von Autorinnen und Autoren des modernen Diskurses bis heute und stellt den Zusammenhang mit verwandten Phänomenen der Sinnleere und Erschöpfung her. Als zunehmendes Massenphänomen in saturierten Gesellschaften entwickelt die Langeweile eine pathologische Dynamik, wenn ihr nicht ein eigener Raum gelassen wird. Ein Plädoyer für die Anerkennung dieses unvermeidlichen Gefühls. (...) Mit Texten von Blaise Pascal, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Charles Baudelaire, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, Bertrand Russell, Iwan Gontscharow, Siegfried Kracauer, Emil Cioran, Giacomo Leopardi, Wolf Lepenies, Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Peter Toohey, Martin Doehlemann, Françoise Wemelsfelder und anderen. (shrink)

Hasta la fecha, el significado de salud y por lo tanto de tratamiento y rehabilitación está referenciado al cuerpo normal o típico de la especie. Las intervenciones terapéuticas tienen cada vez más el potencial de generar habilidades corporales más allá de las ‘normales’ (mejoras terapéuticas). El campo de la rehabilitación, el deseo de disfrutar de habilidades corporales especialmente más allá de las típicas para la especie y la dirección y gobernanza de la ciencia y la tecnología están cada vez más (...) interrelacionadas. Cómo juzgamos y hacemos frente a habilidades corporales o falta de ellas, entre otros, influencia la dirección y gobernanza de los procesos de ciencia y tecnología, productos e investigación y desarrollo e influencia el sentido y el alcance de la salud y la rehabilitación, la identidad y la descripción de los profesionales de salud y rehabilitación, los deseos de los clientes de salud y rehabilitación para recabar sus puntos de vista sobre cuestiones relativas a la mejora del cuerpo y su impacto sobre los profesiones de salud y rehabilitación. La mayoría de encuestados perciben las mejoras humanos más allá de lo ‘normal’ y los cambios asociados como algo inevitable. Los resultados indican que ya es hora de que el discurso de mejora se mueva fuera de la esfera ética y de que el análisis de impacto de mejoras más allá de lo normal se lleve a cabo, que incluya a los hasta ahora prácticamente invisibles profesionales de la salud y la rehabilitación, sus clientes y académicos la política de discapacidad. (shrink)

En el contexto de la pregunta por el destino de la Teoría Crítica, la discusión entre Axel Honneth y Jürgen Habermas sobre el cambio en el paradigma de la Filosofía Política y Social con la tesis "de la comunicación al reconocimiento" gira aquí en torno a una reconstrucción crítica de la filosofía de Immanuel Kant, un Kant ´moderado´ en un modelo ´explicativo´ o ´hermenéutico´, y así ´irrebasable´ del progreso moral, rompiendo su sistema, y un Kant ´destrascendentalizado´, apto para fundamentar la (...) necesidad de un diálogo entre la razón y la fe. ¿Por qué Kant y no Georg Hegel, central este último para los dos filósofos alemanes en su superación de las aporías de la primera generación de la Teoría Crítica? Pero ¿dónde queda Karl Marx, tan importante para los fundadores de la Escuela de Frankfurt? Y ¿no había exigido Habermas en 2009 con motivo del aniversario de su discípulo, que Honneth, después de su viaje de Marx a Hegel, hiciera el necesario regreso? De tal manera que en esta vuelta, Honneth trajera en su equipaje lo rescatado del Idealismo Alemán. Así la historia de la Teoría Crítica queda inconclusa. In the context of the question for the fate of the Critical Theory, the debate between Axel Honneth and Jürgen Habermas on the change in the paradigm of Social and Political Philosophy with the thesis "from communication to recognition" here revolves around a critical reconstruction of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, a ‘moderated’ Kant in an ‘explanatory’ or ‘hermeneutic’ model, and so ‘unsurpassable’ moral progress, breaking his system, and a ‘distranscended’ Kant, suitable to substantiate the need for a dialogue between reason and faith. Why Kant and not Georg Hegel, the latter being central for the two German philosophers in their overcoming of the aporias of the first generation of the Critical Theory? But where it remains Karl Marx, so important to the founders of the Frankfurt School? And in 2009, on the occasion of the anniversary of his disciple, had not Habermas demanded that Honneth, after his journey from Marx to Hegel, made the necessary back? In such a way that in this return, Honneth brought the salvage of German Idealism in his luggage. This way the history of the Critical Theory remains incomplete. (shrink)

Constraints to the sustainability of insecticide use include effects on human health, agroecosystems (e.g., beneficial insects), the wider environment (e.g., non-target species, landscapes and communities) and the selection of insecticide-resistant traits. It is possible to find examples where insecticides have impacted disastrously on all these variables and others where the hazards posed have been (through accident or design) ameliorated. In this review, we examine what can currently be surmised about the direct and indirect long-term, field impacts of insecticides upon the (...) environment. We detail specific examples, describe current insecticide use patterns, consider the contexts within which insecticide use occurs and discuss the role of regulation and legislation in reducing risk. We consider how insecticide use is changing in response to increasing environmental awareness and inevitably, as we discuss the main constraints to insecticide use, we suggest why they cannot easily be discarded. (shrink)

The article describes a rarely mentioned and discussed method of explication first found in Chapter six of Descartes’s posthumously published _The World_ (_Le Monde_), where he uses a fictitious cosmological narrative to develop an account of our material universe and its laws. The assumption of such an approach is that the thing’s structure (nature) can be revealed by its genesis (its producibility), even if the latter is fictitious, or rather, precisely _because_ it is fictitious. This method of “genetic epistemology” turns (...) out to be surprisingly influential: it is found, for example, in Rousseau’s reflections on the state of nature, but also in commentaries on Descartes’s philosophy – e.g. in Martial Gueroult’s principle of “the order of reasons”. (shrink)

Eine weit verbreitete Auffassung über die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse besagt, dass ihre historische Entwicklung von einer zunehmenden Abgrenzung gegenüber der Magie begleitet gewesen sei. Ursprünglich eng mit der Magie verbunden, hätten sich die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse in einem langwierigen Prozess immer weiter von der Magie entfernt, bis sie ihre heutige amagische Gestalt erhalten hätten. Mein Beitrag diskutiert einige Argumente zur Stützung dieser, wie ich meine, plausiblen Auffassung. / A whitespread view of the natural sciences holds that their historical development was accompanied by (...) a constantly widening gap between them and magic. Originally closely bound up with magic, the sciences are supposed to have distanced itself from it in a long-drawn-out process, until they attained their present magic-free form. This essay discusses some arguments in support of this plausible view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)

Mitchell Greenʼs conception of the thesis of Literary Cognitivism states that literary fiction can be a source of knowledge that depends crucially on its being fictional. By a modal argument the authors show that the criterion of fictionality cannot be crucial to the epistemic value of literary fiction. Rather, it lays in a certain kind of distance, e.g. a temporal, cultural, or interpersonal one. This will be motivated by drawing parallels to Gadamerʼs hermeneutics, especially his conception of fusion of horizons. (...) In doing so, we agree with Green’s characterisation of knowledge that can be gained from engaging with literary fiction, but present a different approach to the source of this knowledge. At the same time, this approach enables us to extend the epistemic value of literary fiction both quantitatively and qualitatively. (shrink)

Axel Honneth se pregunta si el concepto del reconocimiento puede hacerse cargo de la función que Jürgen Habermas había atribuido al concepto de la comunicación. Con ello se coloca en posición crítica frente a la tradición de pensamiento en la que él mismo se inscribe, la teoría crítica. Cuestiona ante todo el carácter abstracto o formal de la teoría moral que se da en la Ética del Discurso, que remite finalmente a Habermas a Kant. Honneth, por su lado, se apoya (...) en el joven y casi materialista Hegel de Jena y en el behaviorista G. H. Mead, para proponer una teoría de la sociedad, no ajena a lo empírico, que contenga sustancia normativa , equidistante del formalismo de la ética comunicativa y de la materialidad del comunitarismo, superando así las dos tendencias, la universalista y la relativista, con el fin de mediarlas.Axel Honneth asks himself if the concept of recognition can assume the function that Jürgen Habermas had attributed to the concept of communication. Thus he places himself in a critical position regarding the thinking tradition he belonged to-the critic theory. He questions the abstract or formal character of the moral theory of the Ethics of Discourse, which ultimately leads to Habermas and Kant. Honneth, on his side, seeks support in the young and almost materialist Hegel of Jena and in the behaviorist G. H. Mead to propose a theory of society, not altogether unempirical, somehow normative , equidistant from the formalism of communicative ethics and from the materiality of "communitarism", and going beyond both universalism and relativism. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical examination of Kierkegaard's account of friendship, and considers whether he accounts sufficiently for the transformative possibilities of friendship. Part I gives a brief discussion of ethical friendship in Either/Or, then turns to Works of Love and its critique of friendship. Kierkegaard does, however, retrieve and affirm friendship insofar as it is transformed by Christian neighbor love. The author then proceeds to consider whether this transformed friendship can also be genuinely transformative. Part II draws on Kierkegaard's (...) analysis of the leveling effects of modern culture, and argues that friendship can play an important role in resisting this threat by helping to initiate and preserve religious actuality. The author of the article contends that Kierkegaard needs to be pushed further on this point, since his writings remain ambivalent regarding such a possibility. Similarly, Part III examines Kierkegaard's openness to a concept of transformative Christian friendship. To this end, the article considers the possibility of friendship with Christ. Then, drawing on John 15, the Christological basis for friendship is taken into consideration. Finally, through Kierkegaard's account of Christ's friendship with Peter, the author of the article concludes that a charitable reading of Kierkegaard points us toward transformative friendship, even though it seems also clear that the Danish thinker does not venture far enough in that direction himself. /// O presente artigo analisa criticamente o pensamento de Kierkegaard sobre a amizade, interrogando-se particularmente até que ponto ele dará ou não suficiente atenção às possibilidades transformativas da mesma. Começando com uma breve discussão da amizade ética na obra Alternativa, o artigo passa depois a uma análise de Obras do Amor e à crítica da amizade que nela se faz. Mostra-se, assim, que Kierkegaard retoma e afirma a amizade na medida em que ela é transformada pelo amor ao próximo. A questão seguinte tem a ver com a possibilidade de esta amizade transformada poder também ela mesma ser genuinamente transformativa. Num segundo momento, o autor do artigo toma em consideração a análise que Kierkegaard faz dos efeitos niveladores da cultura moderna, argumentando que a amizade pode desempenhar um papel importante na resistência a esta ameaça ajudando a iniciar e a preservar a actualidade religiosa da mesma. O autor considera que Kierkegaard precisa de ser confrontado no que se refere a esta questão dado que os seus escritos permanecem ambivalentes a propósito desta possibilidade. De igual modo, num terceiro momento do artigo, o autor analisa a abertura de Kierkegaard ao conceito cristão de uma amizade transformativa. Para este fim, é considerada sobretudo a possibilidade da nossa amizade com Cristo. Neste contexto, o artigo aborda, nomeadamente em referência ao capítulo 15 do Evangelho de S. João, a base Cristo-lógica da amizade. Por fim, o artigo faz referência à amizade de Cristo com Pedro e conclui que uma leitura benevolente de Kierkegaard não pode deixar de nos apontar para uma visão transformativa da amizade, ainda que o pensador dinamarquês não pareça ir suficientemente longe nesta direcção. (shrink)

Jean Baudrillards Kulturphilosophie läßt sich durch die Behauptung charakterisieren, daß die Medien in der modernen Kultur vorherrschend geworden sind. Seine These, die Medien hätten jeden Bezug zu einer von ihnen unabhängigen Realität verloren, haben zahlreiche Autorinnen und Autoren nihilistisch genannt. Das Zutreffende dieser Kennzeichnung verdankt sich im Wesentlichen einem eingeschränkten, auf das 19. Jahrhundert zurückweisenden Begriff des Nihilismus. Allerdings nimmt Baudrillard auf Phänomene Bezug, die er historisch später verortet und die sich ihrer Struktur nach kategorial von den Funktionen der Medien (...) im 19. Jahrhundert unterscheiden. Es gelingt ihm hierbei nicht, den allgemeinen Realitätsverlust, den er vor allem auf den wachsenden Einfluß von Wissenschaft und Technik im 20. Jahrhundert zurückführt, überzeugend nachzuweisen. -/- Als wolle er diesen Mangel beheben, führt Baudrillard in späteren Schriften weitere Struktureigenschaften der kulturellen Mediendominanz ein. Zu diesen Fortentwicklungen gehört die durch Medienmacht erzeugte „Transparenz“, die nicht zuletzt die restlose Durchsichtigkeit aller Zustände und Prozesse meint. Es ist dieses Merkmal, das Baudrillard 1981 selbst mit einem Nihilismusbegriff in Verbindung bringt. Der Nihilismus der Transparenz beansprucht, das spezifisch Neue der Sinnlosigkeit in zunehmend wissenschafts- und technikbestimmten Gesellschaften zu erfassen. Obwohl sich die Schwächen der Medientheorie in seiner Auffassung des Nihilismus reflektieren, gelingt es ihm, Phänomene der Nichtigkeit zu beschreiben, für die man gute Gründe hat anzunehmen, daß sie sich durch keinen Werte- oder Einstellungswandel mehr aufheben lassen. Um diese Einsicht zu begründen, muß man Baudrillards Medientheorie allerdings gleichsam vom Kopf auf die Füße stellen. Nicht auf einen evidenten, alles umfassenden Realitätsverlust, sondern umgekehrt auf einen Teil der vermutlichen Realitätsgehalte der Medien läßt sich die drohende Ausdehnung der Transparenz zurückführen. (shrink)

John Ellis McTaggart defended an idealistic view of time in the tradition of Hegel and Bradley. His famous paper makes two independent claims (McTaggart1908): First, time is a complex conception with two different logical roots. Second, time is unreal. To reject the second claim seems to commit to the first one, i.e., to a pluralistic account of time. We compare McTaggarts views to the most important concepts of time investigated in physics, neurobiology, and philosophical phenomenology. They indicate that a unique, (...) reductionist account of time is far from being plausible, even though too many conceptions of time may seem unsatisfactory from an ontological point of view. (shrink)

"Wir mögen an der Natur beobachten, messen, rechnen, wägen und so weiter, wie wir wollen, es ist doch nur unser Maß und Gewicht, wie der Mensch das Maß der Dinge ist." So schrieb Goethe im Jahre 1807. "Die Natur wird uns keine Sonderbehandlung gewähren, nur weil wir uns als 'Krone der Schöpfung' betrachten... Ich fürchte, sie ist nicht eitel genug, um sich an den Menschen als einen Spiegel zu klammern, in dem allein sie ihre eigene Schönheit sehen kann", schreibt der (...) Physiker Hans-Peter Dürr heute. Diesen beiden Stellungnahmen liegen sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Verhältnis Mensch - Natur zugrunde. Wie überhaupt die Naturphilosophie von den Vorsokratikern bis in die Gegenwart die unterschiedlichsten Varianten dieser Beziehung durchgespielt hat. Dass der Mensch sich jedoch in einem weit über die alttestamentarische Vorstellungskraft hinausgehenden Maße die Natur "untertan" gemacht und dabei großräumig zerstört hat, steht außer Zweifel. Im Rahmen der ökologischen Krise muss das Verhältnis zur Natur neu überdacht werden. Das vorliegende Lesebuch, das sich auch als Studientext und Diskussionsgrundlage für Schulen und Hochschulen bestens eignet, bietet den Blick in die Geschichte der Naturphilosophie, der dafür unerlässlich ist: Die Schwierigkeiten, die heute im Umgang mit der Natur auftreten, sind vielfach auf immer noch wirksame traditionelle Naturvorstellungen zurückzuführen. Andererseits gibt es einige eigenständige, bisher noch zu wenig berücksichtigte Ansätze, die zu neuen Konzeptionen anregen können. ------------------------------------------------------------- Inhalt: Vorwort; Einführung: Traditionslinien der Naturphilosophie; Heraklit und die Atomisten Leukipp und Demokrit; Platon und Aristoteles; Christliches Naturverstehen im Mittelalter: Aurelius Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Jacob Böhme; Naturvorstellungen in der beginnenden Neuzeit: Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton; Kants Naturbegriff; Goethes Naturforschung; Nachkantische Naturphilosophie: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Geschichte der Natur und Kritik des Naturalismus: Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill; Kritik des Substanzbegriffes, Alfred North Whitehead, Werner Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine und Isabelle Stengers; Bibliographie. (shrink)

Aus dem vielfältigen Werk von Hermann von Helmholtz versammelt diese Ausgabe die im engeren Sinne philosophischen Abhandlungen, vor allem zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Erkenntnistheorie, sowie Vorträge und Reden, bei denen der Autor seine Ausnahmestellung im Wissenschaftsbetrieb nutzte, um die Wissenschaften und ihre Institutionen in der bestehenden Form zu repräsentieren und zu begründen. Ein Philosoph wollte Helmholtz nicht sein, aber er legte der philosophischen Reflexion wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und wissenschaftlichen Handelns große Bedeutung bei. Vor allem bezog er, in der Regel ausgehend von seinen (...) fachwissenschaftlichen Forschungen, in den verschiedensten Kontexten zu erkenntnistheoretischen und methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaften Stellung. Bereits »Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft« (1847) lässt erkennen, wie verwoben naturwissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung und philosophische Grundlagenreflexion in seinem Werk sind. Die aus den frühen sinnesphysiologischen Forschungen hervorgegangene empiristische Wahrnehmungslehre trug ihm den Ruf ein, ein maßgeblicher Vertreter des Neukantianismus zu sein. Spätere Arbeiten v.a. zur Geometrie und Arithmetik – das zeigt die vorliegende Ausgabe – stellen jedoch eine radikale Absage an den konstitutiven Kern des Kantianismus (nämlich die Existenz synthetischer Urteile a priori) dar. Helmholtz’ philosophische Beiträge sind bisher in ihrer Vollständigkeit nicht annähernd so gut zugänglich wie sein naturwissenschaftliches Werk. Die Ausgabe enthält außerdem bibliographische Vorberichte zur Einordnung, detaillierte Namens- und Sachregister sowie mit 575 Einträgen für den Zeitraum zwischen 1842 und 2012 die erste umfassende Bibliographie von Helmholtz verfasster Werke überhaupt. »Ich glaube, dass der Philosophie nur wieder aufzuhelfen ist, wenn sie sich mit Ernst und Eifer der Untersuchung der Erkenntnissprocesse und der wissenschaftlichen Methode zuwendet. Da hat sie eine wirkliche und berechtigte Aufgabe.« Helmholtz in einem Brief um 1875. (shrink)

Langeweile wird in dieser Anthologie als Signatur der Moderne lesbar: Sie durchdringt die gegenwärtige Kultur, wird aber nach wie vor weggeschoben, ja tabuisiert. Der Band bietet eine Textauswahl von klassischen Denkern sowie von Autorinnen und Autoren des modernen Diskurses bis heute und stellt den Zusammenhang mit verwandten Phänomenen der Sinnleere und Erschöpfung her. Als zunehmendes Massenphänomen in saturierten Gesellschaften entwickelt die Langeweile eine pathologische Dynamik, wenn ihr nicht ein eigener Raum gelassen wird. Ein Plädoyer für die Anerkennung dieses unvermeidlichen Gefühls. (...) Mit Texten von Blaise Pascal, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Charles Baudelaire, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, Bertrand Russell, Iwan Gontscharow, Siegfried Kracauer, Emil Cioran, Giacomo Leopardi, Wolf Lepenies, Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Peter Toohey, Martin Doehlemann, Françoise Wemelsfelder und anderen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and diversity"-- ("it is useless to deny or even minimize the incongruities and the contradictions" in Rousseau's statements, as Burgelin says in another book). Instead he puts the finger on the one trait that sets this piece of rationalism (or anti-rationalism, as some would say) apart from all others: not sentiment verging on the mystical, but egocentrism, existentially founded and unique. Rousseau, taking a stand (...) outside the battling parties, outside his own religion, becomes more and more "une existence solitaire en face d'une autre existence, qui le regarde," that "other existence" which he calls God. Alas, the descent from such existential heights is swift. Soon the solitary thinker will be enmeshed again in unsolitary speculations about those very issues he had left behind in his flight into the self. Where will this strange pilgrim's progress end? In 1769, seven years before his death and feeling the cold breath of old age upon him, Jean-Jacques wrote: "In my childhood I believed by authority, in my youth by feeling, in my mature age by reason; now I believe because I have always believed." Burgelin cites this as proof that Rousseau never ceased to believe. Maybe so. But is this the point? What the passage defines is the pilgrim's irreversible religious itinerary. On cannot but ask what the next inevitable stop on the road would have been. Waiting for Godot? "Whoever makes an effort to find in Rousseau's work an explicit philosophy... runs into a very peculiar difficulty, for a philosophy is defined above all by its coherence, and [Rousseau] himself warns us against his own methods." With these words Pierre Burgelin opened his monumental work, La philosophic de l'existence de ].-]. Rousseau (1952). It is in the several pertinent chapters of this earlier work that the reader will find what the present book withholds: a philosophical analysis as rigorous as it is profound and comprehensive, the best analysis we have to Rousseau's religious thought. Professor Burgelin's new book merely proves that not even he can do justice to Jean-Jacques without explaining him. GREGORSEBBA Emory University l~mile ou de l'dducation. Par Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Introduction, bibliographic, notes, et index analytique par Francois et Pierre Richard. gdition illustr~e. (Paris: ~ditions Garnier Fr~res, 1962. Pp. 1 + 664 [1].) While the new Pldiade edition of Rousseau, a model of contemporary French scholarship, makes its slow, stately way towards completion, the well-known yellow Classiques Garnier keep coming out in new editions or simply in new dress. This 12mile is a handsomely produced, very readable BOOK REVIEWS 259 reissue of the 1939 Garnier edition, with reproductions of eighteenthcentury engravings on themes of Rousseau. They add rich period flavor to this strange work in which a hypermodern intelligence talks the language of three centuries ago. There are useful notes, the detailed subject index is exceptionally well laid out, the spacious bibliography is ample for Rousseau 's sources and influence, but its meager twentieth-century section should have been reworked and brought up to date. The Introduction, too, can still be read with much profit, even though its critical standpoint is now antiquated, eloquent proof of the effectiveness of Rousseau scholarship in the last two decades. For its price this is a very handy, serviceable edition to have until the Biblioth~que de la PMiade catches up with Garnier Fr~res. Emory University GREGOR SEBBA Kant's Theory o[ Knowledge. By Graham Bird. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. Pp. x + 210. ~5.50.) In the Preface the author states that he has two main objectives in his book: To pursue one central argument through the Critique of Pure Reason and to discuss Kant's views in terms of a modern philosophical idiom. Bird follows this programme out through most of the book, departing from it on only one occasion, in Chapter 11 (pp. 181-188) in which he discusses and criticizes Strawson's theory of personality (as presented in his book Individuals, chap. 3). The space given to Strawson does not, however, constitute a serious digression from the main argument because it comes at the end of a chapter devoted... (shrink)